

Representation and Local People's Congresses in China: A Case Study of the Yangzhou Municipal People's Congress

Tomoki Kamo · Hiroki Takeuchi

Published online: 8 December 2012

© Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2012

Abstract Local people's congresses have become increasingly active, carrying out legislative activities and (supposedly) supervising state organizations. Based on the analysis of bills submitted to Yangzhou Municipal People's Congresses, we find that congress delegates have increasingly represented the interests and demands of the geographic areas from which they are elected, and that the local people's congress has become a place to present and coordinate various competing interests, which are often contradictory to the interests of the local Party committee that represents the higher authority of the state. In other words, the local people's congress has become a place where two interests intersect: the "central" interests represented by the local Party committee and the "local" interests represented by the local people's congress delegates.

Keywords Local People's Congresses · Democratic Institutions in Authoritarian Regimes · Representation · Remonstrations

Introduction

Contrary to the traditional view of dictatorships, many authoritarian regimes actually have some democratic institutions, especially electoral and legislative systems. While scholars have often considered these democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes a harbinger of democratization [15, 22, 23], Levitsky and Way [9] argue that they are rarely "incomplete or transitional forms of democracy." Following Levitsky and Way's argument, a growing body of literature has found that democratic institutions,

T. Kamo
Department of Policy Management, Keio University, Shonan Fujisawa Campus (SFC),
5322 Endoh, Fujisawa, Kanagawa, Japan
e-mail: tomoki@sfc.keio.ac.jp

H. Takeuchi (✉)
Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, 3300 University Blvd.,
PO Box 750117, Dallas, TX 75275-0117, USA
e-mail: htakeuch@smu.edu

especially elections, legislatures, and parties, help an authoritarian regime survive [1, 10, 12]. For example, Gandhi's comprehensive comparative analysis shows that authoritarian leaders use legislatures and parties to co-opt opposition and maintain power [4]. More importantly, recent discussions of Chinese politics also show how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pursues its survival strategy by designing incentive mechanisms to co-opt and manage key players such as entrepreneurs, local officials, and various groups of citizens [2, 8, 25].

Chinese people's congresses are one of the democratic institutions in China's authoritarian regime. Scholars have neglected people's congresses during the Maoist era for good reasons. For example, O'Brien [18, 80] says: "Chinese legislative practice up to 1976 showed little evidence of deputy policy, allocation, or service responsiveness." Manion [13, 607] concludes: "Congresses acted as 'rubber stamps,' ineffectual in the face of powerful Party committees as well as government institutions." However, this is not an accurate description anymore, and a growing number of studies have pointed out the increasing importance of people's congresses [3, 7, 26]. In particular, local people's congresses (at the provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels) have increased in importance as local lawmakers, and they have rejected an increasing number of bills presented by the CCP—such as bills related to the personnel of the government and reports of activities from government divisions ([7, 11, 13, 26], Chap. 3). Thus, Cho describes the emerging role of local people's congresses in lawmaking and oversight as "from 'rubber stamps' to 'iron stamps'" ([3], Chaps 2–4).

The major reason for the increasing role of local people's congresses (LPCs) in lawmaking and oversight is that many congress delegates—who are often CCP members—rebel against the decisions of the Party. Manion [13, 607] explains: "Confrontation with other political institutions is potentially most consequential in the relationship between the congresses and Communist Party committees." Thus, while there is no doubt that deputies are not simply following Party committee's decisions, it is interesting to explore why congress delegates sometimes choose to reject bills presented by the Party committee. Indeed, CCP member delegates are often critical of Party committee decisions. Why do they oppose these decisions? What do they do in the local people's congress?

In order to answer these questions, this article uses data from the Yangzhou Municipal People's Congress (MPC) in Jiangsu Province.¹ To examine these issues, one needs data on the actions taken by every individual delegate in the decisionmaking processes in a certain people's congress. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to access this kind of information. However, we have access to detailed information about the behavior of individual delegates in the Yangzhou MPC. The information includes each delegate's personal background (name, gender, year of birth, affiliation and employment unit, ethnic identity, education, party affiliation, and other personal information) for all 416 delegates of the fourth congress (1998–2002) and all 428 delegates of the fifth congress (2003–2007). We also have access to the bills proposed by the delegates between the third and fifth sessions (2000–2002) of the fourth congress and during the first and second sessions (2003–2004) of the fifth congress. The Yangzhou MPC is the only congress at the municipal level that fully discloses the

¹ The data come from the Yangzhou MPC website: <http://www.yzrd.gov.cn/index.asp>.

above-mentioned information on all the individual delegates, the proposed bills, and the names of bill sponsors during the period of 2000–2004.

Based on the analysis of the bills submitted to the Yangzhou MPC during this period, we argue that delegates of the Yangzhou MPC play dual roles of agents for the regime and advocates for their constituency. In addition to the traditional role of explaining government policy to their constituents, the congress delegates now increasingly represent the interests and demands of their electoral districts. They present and coordinate competing interests from various electoral districts, which are often contradictory to the interests of the municipal Party committee that represents the regime and the superior government. Thus, the MPC becomes a place where two interests intersect: the regime's "central" interests from the municipal Party committee and the constituency's "local" interests from MPC delegates. In other words, while the delegates still serve as "a bridge (*qiaoliang*) from the leadership to the citizenry" ([19], 360), they have strengthened their roles in what O'Brien [19] defines as "remonstration," acting to "seek attention and transmit information that may help rectify administration...[and] assert a right to recognize injustices and mistakes, and to confront leaders." At the same time, the strengthened role as remonstrators might bring not only the institutionalization of the government's decisionmaking processes but also more representative forms of political participation.

Note that we only have access to data regarding the process of submitting bills. Although how many and what kind of bills were ultimately passed are questions that naturally arise from this study, to obtain such data would require another round of field research in Yangzhou. We do not have access to this data online and were unable to obtain the information during the initial field research. If the bills are passed in the MPC, then they will influence local governance directly. Otherwise, the act of submitting bills will not have an impact of "real" representation but merely an "expressive" one. Answering the question of what happened to the bills and exploring why some bills are passed and others are not is a task for future research.

This article proceeds as follows. The first section briefly reviews the institutional context of the LPCs. The second section introduces the composition of the delegates of the Yangzhou MPC. The third section details the characteristics of the bills proposed to the Yangzhou MPCs. The fourth section examines whether the roles that delegates of the Yangzhou MPC play strengthen China's authoritarian regime. The fifth section concludes.

Local People's Congresses in China's Authoritarian Regime

Studies have agreed that since the market-oriented post-Mao reform started in the late 1970s, people's congresses have been more active in lawmaking and the supervision over courts and other governmental organizations [18, 24]. Moreover, as Cho [3, 3] emphasizes, "local legislatures' supervision of governments is more active and effective than that of the NPC [National People's Congress]." At the same time, O'Brien [21, 131] suggests that the increasing role of LPCs in lawmaking and supervising governmental organizations "has less to do with responsiveness and changing state-society relations and more to do with state-building, restructuring bureaucratic ties and making Party rule predictable and effective."

In his pioneering work on the Chinese legislature, O'Brien argued that the institutionalization of the people's congress system did not bring liberalization but brought rationalization and inclusion [18]. Rationalization helped improve one-party rule by "routinizing and legalizing political power and circumscribing the authority of individual leaders" ([18], 5), and inclusion helped the regime to "preempt political challenges and protect party rule" ([18], 6) by expanding the regime's influence on various forces in society and the market. LPCs have functions of both rationalization (through legislation) and inclusion (through supervision), but they have a comparative advantage on inclusion as they directly interact with local social organizations that "claim to *represent* the interests of specific social groups" ([3], 5; italics added). As a result, LPCs are in an advantageous position to "institutionally acknowledge social diversity and grant limited access and influence to nonparty forces" ([18], 6)—measures that make inclusion work.

Thus, as the post-Mao market-oriented reform has advanced, LPCs have been empowered. Congress delegates have been increasingly active in submitting bills to exercise their strengthened lawmaking and supervisory roles. They have apparently been in conflict with the CCP by rejecting an increasing number of bills presented by the Party committee. The CCP's intended outcome of strengthening local people's congresses is that these legislative activities will help the regime stay informed of people's dissatisfaction with the government, as the regime has faced an increasing number of social uprisings and protests.

Meanwhile, previous studies have agreed that more active and institutionalized LPCs are not a harbinger of democratization, but that they strengthen the authoritarian regime. For example, Cho [3, 169] concludes: "China's leaders have envisioned legislative development as a means of introducing a proper legal system and precipitating the rationalization of governance.... Therefore, in this view, past legislative development is irrelevant to Chinese democracy." Xia [26, 256] has a slightly different view as he says: "PCs [people's congresses] at all levels will someday become important stages for political forces, particularly new parties, to negotiate with the ruling CPC [Communist Party of China] for a democratic transition." However, neither Cho nor Xia describes any clear, specific path for China to be a democratic nation by strengthening the people's congress system.

This article explores whether this conclusion can be applied to the case of the Yangzhou MPC, where we have the advantage of data accessibility. What do congress delegates do when their constituency's interests do not align with the Party committee's interests? We show that in such cases, delegates may represent their constituency's interests even when they conflict with the Party's interests. Why do they represent their constituency instead of the Party? Are these delegates' "rebellious" acts a harbinger of further political reform or even democratization?

Overview of Yangzhou MPC Delegates

In addition to the data from the Yangzhou MPC website, this article also draws on interviews with eight delegates of the Yangzhou MPC, all of whom are members of the special committees (*gongzuo weiyuanhui*) of the standing committee of the MPC. The interviews were conducted in 2008 by the first author of this article. The interviews were semi-structured. All interview questions were open-ended: respondents

answered questions in as many or as few words as they deemed necessary.² Each informant was asked a number of relevant questions, and follow-up questions varied depending on their answers to the originally prepared questions. Moreover, questions were updated along with the progress of the field research. Interview questions focused on the bills the informants proposed. The interviews were arranged by the Yangzhou MPC office.

Before discussing the actions and roles of Yangzhou MPC delegates, we briefly review the MPC's composition. Like other MPCs in China, delegates of the Yangzhou MPC are elected by congress delegates at the "county" level that includes districts (*qu*) and county-level cities (CLCs: *xianji shi*) as well as counties (*xian*), while "county" congress delegates are directly elected by their constituents. Thus, one can say that MPC delegates are indirectly elected by their constituents.

Table 1 shows the summary. The 416 delegates of the fourth congress were elected by congress delegates of the seven county-level administrative units in Yangzhou Municipality (i.e., Baoying, Gaoyou, Guangling, Hanjiang, Jiangdu, Jiaoqu, and Yizheng, which, for convenience, we call "electoral districts" in this article), and from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Among the seven electoral districts, three—Guangling, Hanjiang, and Jiaoqu (which literally means "the Suburb")—are districts; Gaoyou, Jiangdu, and Yizheng are CLCs; and Baoying is a county. In the same way, the 428 delegates of the fifth congress were also elected from seven electoral districts and from the PLA. Guangling and Jiaoqu were redistricted after the fourth congress, becoming new districts (Guangling and Weiyang).

The delegates of the fourth congress of the Yangzhou MPC are similar to the delegates of other MPCs elected in the late 1990s in terms of the ratio of CCP members, the ratio of members of democratic parties (*minzhu zhu dangpai*), the gender ratio, and their education level. One important change from the fourth congress to the fifth congress is a significant increase in the delegates' education level. In the fifth congress, 85 % of the delegates had received high school or higher education compared to 66 % in the fourth congress. Table 2 shows the composition of the congress delegates categorized into agricultural rural areas (county), industrialized rural areas (CLC), and urban areas (district). The increase in the delegates' education level occurred more in rural areas (both agricultural and industrialized) than in urban areas, although their education level increased in both rural and urban areas from the fourth congress to the fifth congress.

Characteristics of Bills Proposed in the Yangzhou MPC

Table 3 shows how many bills were submitted and how many recommendations were made in each session of the Yangzhou MPC between 2001 and 2005. The submitted bills address a wide range of concerns and questions, including cultural and educational issues, environment protection issues, urban development issues—such as road construction and maintenance, bridge construction projects, port construction projects, and requests for establishing economic development zones (*jingji kaifa qu*)—and administrative issues—such as taxation, public transportation management, and

² In this sense, the interview method used in this article is different from the structured interview methods that follow the same questionnaire in every interview [5]. Instead the interviews used here are similar to those conducted by Hurst [6, 9], which "allowed interviewees to discuss issues and ideas that concerned them."

Table 1 Composition of the Delegates of the Yangzhou MPC

<i>Fourth Congress</i>		Total Delegates	CCP Members	Members of Democratic Parties	Male Deputies	Delegates with High School Education or Above
Baoying	County	64	47 (73 %)	1 (2 %)	47 (73 %)	38 (59 %)
Gaoyou	CLC	67	50 (75 %)	1 (1 %)	49 (73 %)	37 (55 %)
Guangling	District	78	59 (70 %)	3 (4 %)	65 (83 %)	60 (77 %)
Hanjiang	District	39	30 (77 %)	1 (3 %)	35 (90 %)	29 (74 %)
Jiangdu	CLC	83	61 (71 %)	3 (4 %)	64 (77 %)	52 (63 %)
Jiaoqu	District	20	15 (75 %)	2 (10 %)	17 (85 %)	13 (65 %)
Yizheng	CLC	53	36 (67 %)	2 (4 %)	42 (79 %)	36 (68 %)
PLA		12	12 (100 %)	0 (0 %)	12 (100 %)	11 (91 %)
Total		416	310 (73 %)	13 (3 %)	331 (80 %)	276 (66 %)
<i>Fifth Congress</i>						
<i>Fifth Congress</i>		Total Delegates	CCP Members	Members of Democratic Parties	Male Deputies	Delegates with High School Education or Above
Baoying	County	66	51 (77 %)	1 (2 %)	54 (82 %)	54 (82 %)
Gaoyou	CLC	66	51 (77 %)	2 (3 %)	51 (77 %)	51 (77 %)
Guangling	District	55	45 (82 %)	2 (4 %)	44 (80 %)	45 (82 %)
Hanjiang	District	41	31 (76 %)	3 (7 %)	34 (83 %)	38 (93 %)
Jiangdu	CLC	85	62 (73 %)	2 (2 %)	71 (84 %)	71 (84 %)
Weiyang	District	46	36 (78 %)	3 (7 %)	37 (80 %)	40 (87 %)
Yizheng	CLC	56	38 (68 %)	1 (2 %)	43 (77 %)	50 (89 %)
PLA		13	13 (100 %)	0 (0 %)	13 (100 %)	13 (100 %)
Total		428	327 (76 %)	14 (3 %)	347 (81 %)	362 (85 %)
<i>National Average</i>			75 %	4 %	78 %	62 %

CLC indicates a county-level city. The data of the national average is from 1998 except for the data on male deputies, which is from 1999

road management. Certain bills argue against policy proposed by the Party committee. In this article, we will show that when congress delegates are in conflict with the Party committee, they may represent their constituency instead of the Party.

Interestingly, most of the bills proposed to the Yangzhou MPC between 2001 and 2005 were jointly submitted by delegates from the same district. For example, among the 63 bills proposed in the fourth session of the fourth congress in 2001, 58 bills (92 %) were submitted by multiple delegates from a single electoral district, while only five were by delegates from multiple districts. Among the 58 bills, 16 were submitted by delegates from Hanjiang, 16 from Jiaoqu, 10 from Guangling, 6 from Gaoyou, 5 from Jiangdu, 3 from Yizheng, 2 from Baoying, and 0 from the PLA. For another example, among the 64 bills proposed in the first session of the fifth congress in 2003, 60 bills (93 %) were submitted by multiple delegates from the same electoral

Table 2 Composition of the Delegates of the Yangzhou MPC (Rural–urban Comparison)

<i>Fourth Congress</i>	Total Delegates	CCP Members	Members of Democratic Parties	Male Delegates	Delegates with High School Education or Above
County	64	47 (73 %)	1 (2 %)	47 (73 %)	38 (59 %)
CLC	203	147 (72 %)	6 (3 %)	155 (76 %)	125 (62 %)
District	137	104 (76 %)	6 (4 %)	117 (85 %)	102 (74 %)
PLA	12	12 (100 %)	0 (0 %)	12 (100 %)	11 (91 %)
Total	416	310 (73 %)	13 (3 %)	331 (80 %)	276 (66 %)
<i>Fifth Congress</i>	Total Delegates	CCP Members	Members of Democratic Parties	Male Delegates	Delegates with High School Education or Above
County	66	51 (77 %)	1 (2 %)	54 (82 %)	54 (82 %)
CLC	207	151 (73 %)	5 (2 %)	165 (80 %)	172 (83 %)
District	142	45 (79 %)	8 (6 %)	115 (81 %)	123 (87 %)
PLA	13	13 (100 %)	0 (0 %)	13 (100 %)	13 (100 %)
Total	428	327 (76 %)	14 (3 %)	347 (81 %)	362 (85 %)
<i>National Average</i>		75 %	4 %	78 %	62 %

district, while only four were by delegates from multiple electoral districts. Among the 60 bills, 16 were submitted by delegates from Hanjiang, 10 from Jiangdu, 10 from Weiyang, 8 from Guangling, 7 from Yizheng, 6 from Gaoyou, 2 from Baoying, and 1 from the PLA. Although more delegates were selected from rural areas (county and CLC) than urban areas (district), more bills were submitted by the delegates from urban areas (42 bills by 137 delegates in 2001; 34 bills by 142 delegates in 2003) than rural areas (16 bills by 267 delegates in 2001; 25 bills by 273 delegates in 2003). However, delegates from rural areas submitted many more bills in 2003 than in 2001.

Bills Submitted by Delegates from Multiple Electoral Districts

Before further discussing what motivations were behind the bills submitted by congress delegates from the same electoral district, let us briefly discuss the bills submitted by delegates from multiple electoral districts. Table 4 shows the summary of the five bills submitted by delegates from multiple electoral districts in the fourth

Table 3 Bills and Recommendations to the Yangzhou MPC (2001–2005)

Year	Session	Congress	Bills Submitted	Recommendations
2001	Fourth Session	Fourth Congress	63	224
2002	Fifth Session	Fourth Congress	51	103
2003	First Session	Fifth Congress	64	230
2004	Second Session	Fifth Congress	68	214
2005	Third Session	Fifth Congress	82	202

session of the fourth congress in 2001, and Table 5 shows the same summary of the six such bills in the first session of the fifth congress in 2003.

The first pattern in these bills is that CCP members from multiple electoral districts often jointly submit bills. For example, the bill for the “unified plan for development of Tianning Temple and Zhongning Temple” (2003) was submitted by ten delegates from all seven of the electoral districts of the Yangzhou MPC, and all the submitters were CCP members. In another instance, the bill for “construction of an underground roadway in the vicinity of Wenchangge” (2003) was submitted by delegates from six districts, and all the submitters were CCP members. Moreover, the bills whose submitters include a relatively small number of CCP members—such as the bill for “urban flood prevention projects” (2001) and the bill for “management of urban transportation” (2001)—have eight (the “urban flood” bill) or nine (the “urban transportation” bill) out of the ten submitters from the same electoral district. Therefore, one can speculate that CCP members find it easier to discuss submitting a bill with other CCP member delegates than with non-CCP member delegates. At the same time, the Party committee is often not involved in the process of CCP members submitting a bill. In only one of the eleven bills—i.e., the bill for “construction of an

Table 4 Bills Submitted by Delegates from Multiple Electoral Districts (2001)

Issue	Electoral Districts of Submitters	Party Affiliation of Submitters	Primary Sponsors
Faster Development of the Tourist Industry	Guangling (6) Baoying (2) Jiangdu (1) Yizheng (1)	CCP (8) No Affiliation (2)	Standing Committee; Education, Science, Culture, and Health (SC)
Urban Flood Prevention Projects	Guangling (8) Gaoyou (1) Jiangdu (1)	CCP (6) No Affiliation (4)	Standing Committee; Rural Issues (SC); Urban Construction and Environmental Protection (SC); Office of Water Supply (Province)
Management of Urban Transportation	Jiaoqu (9) Gaoyou (1)	CCP (7) No Affiliation (3)	Standing Committee Rural Issues (SC)
Medical Insurance for Workers	Gaoyou (4) Yizheng (4) Baoying (1) Guangling (1)	CCP (7) Democratic Parties (1) No Affiliation (2)	Standing Committee; Trade Union
Job Training of Laid-off Workers	Yizheng (6) Gaoyou (2) Baoying (1) Guangling (1)	CCP (5) No Affiliation (5)	Standing Committee; Trade Union

SC indicates a subcommittee of the Yangzhou MPC

underground roadway in the vicinity of Wenchangge” (2003)—was the Party committee included as a primary sponsor.

Second, the standing committee of the MPC played a critical role for delegates from multiple electoral districts to jointly submit a bill. For nine of the eleven bills, the standing committee was one of the primary sponsors. For the remaining two bills, a vocational group—lawyers for the bill for the “establishment of the Yangzhou Legal Services Center” (2003) and school teachers for the bill for “implementation of the ‘law for the promotion of educational measures’” (2003)—played a critical role. In this sense, the role of the standing committee does not contradict the role of the CCP. For the bills where submitters are from many districts, the bill is often submitted by CCP members and the standing committee is one of the primary sponsors. Moreover, the standing committee may help a non-CCP delegate cooperate with other delegates to submit a bill. For example, when the bill for “finance of the city budget” (2003) was submitted, the initiator of the bill, not a CCP member, took advantage of his position as a standing committee member to mobilize both CCP member delegates and those with no party affiliation.

Third, the bills submitted by congress delegates from multiple electoral districts tend to cover the interests of these electoral districts or the whole Yangzhou Municipality. For example, when a delegate who also served as chair of the Yangzhou municipal trade union initiated two bills for the interests of workers—for “medical insurance for workers” (2001) and “job training of laid-off workers” (2001)—they were written in a way to benefit all the workers in Yangzhou even though he was elected from Yizheng.³ His status as the chair of the municipal trade union gave him an incentive to make the bills cover all workers in the municipality. At the same time, his status as a CCP member and a standing committee member helped him cooperate with other delegates (both CCP and non-CCP delegates) to submit the bill.

In short, when congress delegates need to submit a bill to cover the interests of multiple districts or of the whole Yangzhou municipality, they will use CCP membership, the standing committee of the Yangzhou MPC, and vocational groups to mobilize other delegates to jointly submit the bill. The bills help the regime stay informed of problems at the local level, and hence delegates and the CCP are not in conflict. This is different from the bills submitted by delegates from the same electoral district. As we discuss in the next part, in those situations, the interests of delegates and the CCP may be at odds with one another.

Bills Submitted by Delegates from the Same Electoral District

When congress delegates from the same electoral district submit a bill, they seek to attract economic and political benefits to their district. In other words, the bills submitted by delegates from the same district often *represent* the interests of the *whole* electoral district. Moreover, based on the examples to be discussed below, delegates may choose to side with their electoral district’s interests when they conflict with the Party committee’s interests. Thus, delegates represent their constituency’s interests when their bills are at odds with the Party’s interests.

³ A trade union is a CCP-sponsored labor union in China.

Table 5 Bills Submitted by Delegates from Multiple Electoral Districts (2003)

Issue	Electoral Districts of Submitters	Party Affiliation of Submitters	Primary Sponsors
Promotion of the New “Non-staple Foods Project”	Yizheng (5) Guangling (4) Baoying (3) Gaoyou (1) Hanjiang (1)	CCP (10) No Affiliation (1) Unknown (3)	Standing Committee; Standing Committee (County); Rural Issues (County SC); Finance and Economy (County SC)
Establishment of the Yangzhou Legal Services Center	Baoying (2) Gaoyou (2) Guangling (2) Hanjiang (2) Jiangdu (1) Yizheng (1)	CCP (9) No Affiliation (1)	Lawyers
Finance of the City Budget	Gaoyou (4) Yizheng (3) Unknown (3)	CCP (3) Democratic Parties (2) No Affiliation (2) Unknown (3)	Standing Committee
Implementation of the “Law for the Promotion of Educational Measures”	Guangling (5) Hanjiang (3) Gaoyou (1) Yizheng (1)	CCP (9) Democratic Parties (1)	School Teachers
Unified Plan for Development of Tianning Temple and Zhongning Temple	Baoying (2) Guangling (2) Hanjiang (2) Gaoyou (1) Jiangdu (1) Weiyang (1) Yizheng (1)	CCP (10)	Standing Committee; Environmental Protection Bureau
Construction of an Underground Roadway in the Vicinity of Wenchangge	Baoying (2) Hanjiang (2) Jiangdu (2) Weiyang (2) Gaoyou (1) Guangling (1)	CCP (10)	Standing Committee; Party Committee

County SC indicates a subcommittee of the county people’s congress

While the total number of bills submitted by congress delegates from the same electoral district in each session amount to several dozen per session during the period between 2001 and 2005 (see Table 3), we only discuss six bills as cases to develop our argument. We selected these six bills because we are most familiar with the submission process and the delegates’ motivation behind the submission, which we determined through the first author’s fieldwork. In other words, the sample of the bills selected in this article was a convenience sample. In this way, we are able to provide rich details and analysis of the incentives of delegates when submitting such bills.

For example, Bill No. 12 in the fourth session of the fourth congress of the Yangzhou MPC in 2001 aimed to establish a special economic zone in Hangji Town of Hangjian District. The bill required the municipal government to grant the district government the authority to approve economic projects and to confer preferential taxation and other economic measures in the special economic zone. Thus, it contradicted the interests of the municipal Party committee, which preferred to keep that authority.

Hangjiang is located in the eastern part of Yangzhou Municipality, which is less developed than the central or western part of the municipality. Thus, congress delegates from western Yangzhou (such as Hangjiang and Yizheng) had a strong incentive to legislate measures to promote economic development in their districts. Hangji Town was selected as a location for a special economic zone, because it is close (only ten kilometers) to the center of downtown Yangzhou, and hence one could expect a relatively low transportation cost to carry products from the special economic zone to downtown Yangzhou—where one can ship products by canal. Moreover, a freeway that connects to Nanjing, Nantong, Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou, and Shanghai originates in Hangjiang. Thus, Hangji had an infrastructure advantage, especially in transportation. Furthermore, the provincial government had designated Hangji as one of the 30 key towns for economic development in Jiangsu Province. One could therefore expect subsidies and support from the provincial government.

The bill was submitted by the following ten congress delegates, all from Hangjiang:

D1: member of the Yangzhou MPC standing committee; president of the Jiangsu Sanxiao Group (private enterprise); vice president of the Hangjiang District Industrial and Commercial Association; no party affiliation.

D2: vice president of the Jiangsu Sanxiao Group; CCP member.

D3: chair of the economic committee of the Hangjiang District government; CCP member.

D4: chief of the Hangjiang District industrial bureau; member of the economic committee of the Hangjiang District government; CCP member.

D5: member of the production planning committee of the Hangjiang District government; no party affiliation.

D6: cotton apparel factory worker; no party affiliation.

D7: member of the Hangjiang District management bureau; member of one of the democratic parties.

D8: chair of the Hangjiang District people's congress standing committee; CCP member.

D9: chief of the Hangjiang District tobacco bureau; president of a tobacco company; CCP member.

D10: chief of the agricultural bureau of the Yangzhou municipal government.

Not surprisingly, the delegates that submitted this bill were all in positions that would benefit from the economic development of Hangji and Hangjiang, especially by the designation of a special economic zone in Hangji. They include economic officials in the Hangjiang District government such as the chair of the economic committee (D3), the chief of the industrial bureau (D4), a member of the production planning committee (D5), and a member of the management bureau (D7). The economic officials in Hangjiang would also benefit from the designation of a special

economic zone by receiving additional authority on economic policymaking. Moreover, it was not a coincidence that the president and the vice president of the Jiangsu Sanxiao Group (D1 and D2) were included as submitters of the bill. The Jiangsu Sanxiao Group started as a township-and-village enterprise (*xiangzhen qiye*) in Hangji in 1989. It currently holds a dominant share of toothbrush production in China. In 2002, it earned revenue of 1.4 billion yuan—the highest among private enterprises in Yangzhou—and profit of 103 million yuan—the fourth highest in Yangzhou and the highest in Hangjiang.⁴ In sum, it was the largest and most influential private enterprise located in Hangji and would benefit most from the designation of a special economic zone.

Environmental protection is another issue of public good provision where congress delegates can represent the interests of the whole district, and these interests may not align with those of the Party committee. In the following example—Bill No. 19 in the fourth session of the fourth congress of the Yangzhou MPC in 2001—delegates from the same electoral district submitted a bill seeking environmental protection and the improvement of the living environment of residents in their district. It involved the development of a green area neighboring the Yangzhou Educational Institute of Science and Technology, a college training teachers in science and technology in the Yangzhou University system, located in downtown Yangzhou, Guangling District. A dispute had arisen when the college and local residents opposed the green area development plan proposed by the developer, Yangzhou Wangjiang Real Estate. Ten delegates, all from Guangling, jointly submitted a bill seeking to resolve the dispute. In the bill, they proposed that the municipal government should suspend the plan to construct a parking lot in the green area. The construction of the parking lot was originally planned in 1993 to alleviate the parking problems of Shouxihu Park, a major sightseeing attraction in Yangzhou.

The bill argued that the municipal government should suspend the current plan to construct a parking lot for four reasons, directly challenging the policy of the municipal Party committee. First, the area adjoined a historic and cultural facility, the White Tower. The construction of a tall parking structure would spoil the scenic view. Second, if the parking lot was constructed, exhaust fumes and noise caused by the cars entering and exiting the facility would affect approximately 10,000 people living in Yangzhou University faculty housing and many other residents in nearby areas. Third, Yangzhou Wangjiang Real Estate had a record of many serious disputes with residents affected by its projects. Finally, the bill suggested that because this construction plan was controversial, eight years had already passed since the municipal government originally proposed the plan to construct a new parking lot; that during those eight years the number of local residents that might be negatively influenced by this parking lot construction had drastically increased; and hence that the municipal government should terminate the plan to construct the parking lot.

Ten congress delegates submitted this bill, all from Guangling:

D11: associate dean of the Physical Education School of Yangzhou University;
member of one of the democratic parties.

⁴ The revenue of the Jiangsu Sanxiao Group is far higher than the revenue of the Hangjiang District government, which was 628 million yuan in 2003. The data are from the 2003 Yangzhou official statistics: <http://www.yzstats.gov.cn/gzsc/2003>.

D12: associate professor of the Agricultural School of Yangzhou University; member of one of the democratic parties.

D13: professor of the Business School of Yangzhou University (chemist); member of one of the democratic parties.

D14: vice president of Disa People's Hospital (physician); no party affiliation.

D15: chair of the Yangzhou Municipal Association of Foreign Language Teachers (teacher at the middle school in affiliation with Yangzhou University); no party affiliation.

D16: curator of the Baguai Museum; CCP member.

D17: traffic police officer; CCP member.

D18: chancellor of Second Elementary School in affiliation with Yangzhou Teacher's College; CCP member.

D19: physician at Shizi Hospital; no party affiliation.

D20: administrative staff of Yangzhou Municipal Physical Education School; no party affiliation.

Not surprisingly, three of the delegates belonged to Yangzhou University (D11, D12, and D13) and two others belonged to the organizations affiliated with the Yangzhou University school system (D15 and D18). They shared direct interests in the environmental protection that this bill might achieve. Interestingly, they submitted the bill together with two physicians (D14 and D19), an expert in cultural heritage (D16), and a traffic police officer (D17), all of whom were able to provide their special knowledge in writing the bill.

One can see a similar pattern of cooperation between congress delegates sharing common interests and delegates providing their special knowledge in legislation in another bill on environmental protection in the same session. Bill No. 33 addressed polluting activities by a cement factory in Jiaoqu. This cement factory issued soot, smoke, and drainage into neighboring rural areas in Jiaoqu. The bill instructed the municipal government to take measures to ameliorate the environmental destruction caused by the factory, while the municipal Party committee was interested in giving priority to the factory's operation over environmental measures.

The bill claimed that the pollution caused by the cement factory deteriorated the local living environment. For example, in the 20-square-kilometer area surrounding the factory, people were unable to open their windows or hang their laundry outdoors. Moreover, physical examinations of people residing around the factory showed that they tended to have more health problems and the pollution caused by the factory, especially deteriorated air quality, was suspected as the cause. The bill also pointed out recent poor crop harvests and argued that it was also caused by the pollution. Moreover, it suggested that farmers had petitioned to their village party branches demanding compensation for their revenue decline, which had caused political instability in rural areas. It also mentioned cases where potential investors decided not to open factories, citing the environmental problem as a reason.

The following ten congress delegates, all from Jiaoqu, proposed the bill:

D21: chief of the Jiaoqu District fiscal bureau; CCP member.

D22: party secretary of Shalian Village; CCP member.

D23: vice chair of the construction committee of the Jiaoqu District government; manager of Hongdafang Real Estate (private enterprise); CCP member.

- D24: manager of Dongjiao Fruits (private enterprise); CCP member.
D25: deputy party secretary of Xihu Town; chair of the Jiaoqu District people's congress standing committee; CCP member.
D26: official of the education division in the Jiaoqu District government; CCP member.
D27: researcher on agricultural technology at the Vegetable Research Center (think tank); no party affiliation.
D28: chair of the construction committee of the Jiaoqu District government; CCP member.
D29: president of Jiuyang Fishing Implements (private enterprise); CCP member.
D30: vice president of Yaxing Bus (private enterprise); CCP member.

Like Bill No. 19, the delegates that submitted the bill included those who shared direct interests in the environmental protection that this bill might bring, such as the party secretary of the village polluted by this factory (D22) and a deputy party secretary of the town influenced by the pollution (D25). As the pollution negatively influenced agriculture and freshwater fishery, it was not surprising that a manager from the fruit industry (D24) and a manager of a fishing implement-producing enterprise (D29) joined the submitters. Moreover, an expert on agricultural technology (D27) joined the submitters to write an effective bill using his special knowledge, especially in explaining the pollution's impact on the decline of agricultural production.

Sometimes a bill is submitted for congress delegates' selfish political reasons such as increasing their authority, but as a result, it benefits local economic interests. Thus, delegates apparently represent their constituency's interests and are at odds with the municipal Party committee's interests. For example, delegates from Jiaoqu submitted Bill No. 38 in the same session in 2001 apparently for their selfish reason of transferring some administrative authority from the Yangzhou municipal government to the Jiaoqu district government. This bill contradicted the interests of the municipal Party committee, which was interested in keeping the authority to make decisions on how to spend the budget. The proposed legislation was concerned with the tax revenue relating to infrastructure construction and maintenance that the municipal government collected in Jiaoqu District. The municipal government returned less than 40 % of the tax revenue to the Jiaoqu district government in the form of public investment. Thus, the bill argued that the municipal government should invest more in infrastructure construction and maintenance in Jiaoqu to match the amount of tax revenue that the municipal government collected there. In other words, the bill demanded that the district government have more authority on how to spend tax revenue. However, this legislation would increase investment for infrastructure in Jiaoqu, and as a result would reflect local people's demands for the increased provision of public goods.

The following ten congress delegates, all from Jiaoqu, submitted the bill:

- D21: chief of the Jiaoqu District fiscal bureau; CCP member.
D22: party secretary of Shalian Village; CCP member.
D23: vice chair of the construction committee of the Jiaoqu District government; manager of Hongdafang Real Estate (private enterprise); CCP member.

- D24: manager of Dongjiao Fruits (private enterprise); CCP member.
 D25: deputy party secretary of Xihu Town; chair of the Jiaoqu District people's congress standing committee; CCP member.
 D27: researcher on agricultural technology at the Vegetable Research Center (think tank); no party affiliation.
 D28: chair of the construction committee of the Jiaoqu District government; CCP member.
 D29: president of Jiuyang Fishing Implements (private enterprise); CCP member.
 D31: chair of the Jiaoqu District people's congress standing committee; no party affiliation.
 D32: member of the Yangzhou MPC standing committee; member of one of the democratic parties.

Eight of the delegates were the same ones who submitted Bill No. 33. Not surprisingly, the local officials that would benefit from the transfer of authority (D21, D23, and D28) were included in the submitters. However, it is interesting that some delegates, who had direct interests in Bill No. 33 and were included in its submitters, were also included in the submitters of Bill No. 38 even though they do not share direct interests in this bill (D24, D27, and D29). One could speculate that they were included because the delegates that had direct interests in Bill No. 38 asked those with whom they worked together to submit Bill No. 33 to join them when submitting this bill.

A pattern emerges in which congress delegates may join a group of submitters of a bill even if they do not share direct interests in that particular bill but do share the network created when they submitted an earlier bill together. Bills No. 40 and 41 provide examples of such bills. They are from the same session as Bills No. 33 and 38, and all of them were submitted by delegates from Jiaoqu. Bill No. 40 was a follow-up of Bill No. 38, stating that urban infrastructure, especially roads, in Jiaoqu had fallen behind other districts because the Jiaoqu district government did not have an administrative division to manage public transportation and projects, had insufficient funds for public investment, and most importantly, lacked the fiscal authority and resources for infrastructure construction. Thus, the bill argued that the municipal government should transfer fiscal authority to the Jiaoqu District government, so that the funds that the district government could use for infrastructure construction would increase. More specifically, it demanded that the municipal government increase the amount of earmarked fiscal transfer regarding land trade (expropriation and sales) and funds related to construction (especially to roads). Again, it contradicted the interests of the municipal Party committee, which were to keep fiscal authority. Bill No. 40 was submitted by the following ten delegates, all from Jiaoqu:

- D21: chief of the Jiaoqu District fiscal bureau; CCP member.
 D22: party secretary of Shalian Village; CCP member.
 D23: vice chair of the construction committee of the Jiaoqu District government; manager of Hongdafang Real Estate (private enterprise); CCP member.
 D24: manager of Dongjiao Fruits (private enterprise); CCP member.
 D25: deputy party secretary of Xihu Town; chair of the Jiaoqu District people's congress standing committee; CCP member.
 D28: chair of the construction committee of the Jiaoqu District government; CCP member.

- D29: president of Jiuyang Fishing Implements (private enterprise); CCP member.
 D31: chair of the Jiaoqu District people's congress standing committee; no party affiliation.
 D32: member of the Yangzhou MPC standing committee; member of one of the democratic parties.
 D33: deputy chief of the Jiaoqu District vegetable bureau; no party affiliation.

Not surprisingly, nine of the delegates that submitted this bill were included in the submitters of Bill No. 38 (replacing D27 in Bill No. 38 with D33 in Bill No. 40).

Bill No. 41 was also a follow-up of Bill No. 38. It addressed the problem of infrastructure construction in Jiaoqu, demanded more fiscal authority for using tax revenue collected in Jiaoqu, and hence contradicted the municipal Party committee's interests. It also emphasized the need to establish a transportation bureau or a public projects bureau to handle public infrastructure projects in Jiaoqu. The following is the list of the ten congress delegates that submitted the bill:

- D21: chief of the Jiaoqu district fiscal bureau; CCP member.
 D22: party secretary of Shalian Village; CCP member.
 D24: manager of Dongjiao Fruits (private enterprise); CCP member.
 D25: deputy party secretary of Xihu Town; chair of the Jiaoqu district people's congress standing committee; CCP member.
 D27: researcher on agricultural technology at the Vegetable Research Center (think tank); no party affiliation.
 D28: chair of the construction committee of the Jiaoqu district government; CCP member.
 D29: president of Jiuyang Fishing Implements (private enterprise); CCP member.
 D31: chair of the Jiaoqu district people's congress standing committee; no party affiliation.
 D32: member of the Yangzhou MPC standing committee; member of one of the democratic parties.
 D33: deputy chief of the Jiaoqu district vegetable bureau; no party affiliation.

Like Bill No. 40, nine of the ten delegates that submitted Bill No. 41 were also included in the submitters of Bill No. 38 (replacing D23 in Bill No. 38 with D33 in Bill No. 41).

Is the CCP a Winner?

As we have discussed, although congress delegates jointly submit a bill to a people's congress, those submitters tend to come from the same district. Moreover, the bills often focus on economic benefits or the provision of public goods that will benefit the whole electoral district from which all of the delegates submitting the bill are elected. As a result, while delegates represent their local constituency's interests, their bills may argue against policy proposed by the Party committee.

Manion [13] asks who the winner is since the institutional change in the 1995 people's congress reforms allowed CCP candidates to lose. She argues that the CCP is a winner, because the introduction of real competitive elections in the 1995 reform of

CCP regulations and law, which led to losses of more than 17,000 CCP candidates in county people's congress elections, improved the quality of congress delegates without threatening the survival of China's authoritarian regime.

The observation we have introduced in this article seems consistent with this argument. Delegates of the Yangzhou MPC are not simply agents of the Party committee of the municipal and superior governments but represent the interests of the constituency of their electoral districts. They sometimes fight for their constituency's interests against the Party committee's proposal. Thus, they play the role of informing the regime of problems and dissatisfaction that people have over policies. Because this form of representation does not lead to electoral competition, it does not threaten the survival of the regime. While O'Brien [19] argues that people's congress delegates serve as "a bridge (*qiaoliang*) from the leadership to the citizenry," the delegates discussed in this article serve as a bridge from the citizenry to the leadership. In this sense, they are remonstrators *and* representatives.

Does this role of congress delegates threaten the survival of the authoritarian regime? In other words, is this considered a harbinger of democratization? The answer is apparently negative. More than two decades ago, O'Brien [17] suggested that "legislatures have not been static institutions preserving the power of dominant groups or classes, but rather dynamic sources of social mobilization that propel groups into the political process and contribute to the redistribution of society's resources." He concluded that China's National People's Congress (NPC) was "*procedurally* conservative, rather than *substantively* conservative" ([17], 792; italics in the original). In another article, he describes the NPC's function as consultation and playing roles of "translating party policy into law and overseeing policy implementation" ([20], 80–81). Thus, he concludes that the key to empowering the NPC was not autonomy but support and attention from the Party, which he calls "legislative embeddedness" ([20], 86).

The delegates' "rebellious acts" against the Party committee in the Yangzhou MPC apparently suggest that they are not substantively conservative, and that this LPC is not a static institution to simply preserve the regime's interests. At the same time, the finding that delegates of the Yangzhou MPC are divided into fractions along electoral districts implies that both electoral and legislative institutions of LPCs are embedded in the interests of China's authoritarian regime. Thus, the delegates' acts discussed in this article may not be a harbinger of further political reform or democratization.

Although delegates of the Yangzhou MPC are not agents for democratization, they play an important role as "information brokers" between the central and local governments ([3], 3). They express mass opinion by representing their electoral district's constituency even if it is at odds with the policy preferences of the municipal Party committee. In that sense, the LPC's function of lawmaking gives delegates the authority to monitor the local Party organization to respond to popular preferences. Moreover, the representative characteristics of MPC delegates do not contradict the regime's strategy of maintaining one-party rule. This observation is consistent with Nathan's "authoritarian resilience" argument that China's authoritarian regime has established democratic institutions to make authoritarianism "a viable regime form even under conditions of advanced modernization and integration with the global economy" ([16], 16).

Does the representative role that Yangzhou MPC delegates play "contain an apparent 'social volcano' and promote authoritarian stability" ([14], 4)? To this

question, Manion, based on her original surveys of 3,768 local people's congress delegates and 983 ordinary Chinese people, answers affirmatively [14]. She finds that county and township delegates, who are directly elected by their constituency, act "as if" they *represent* their constituency's interests. However, constituents do not consider their congress delegates as their representatives, as they responded in surveys by saying that they did not vote in congressional elections, did not know who their elected deputies are, and did not understand the roles of people's congresses in the government's decisionmaking processes.

We find that the delegates of the Yangzhou MPC discussed in this article represent their constituency's interests even though they are not directly elected by their constituency. In the meantime, the MPC delegates have failed to introduce and solve the issues that extend beyond their own districts. In the few cases discussed in this article where delegates from multiple districts proposed a bill, one of the key factors that made it possible was the network among CCP members. By contrast, cadres of Party committees do not involve themselves in bills in conflict with the local Party committee's interests. For example, the submitters of Bills No. 38, 40, and 41, discussed above, which would undermine the fiscal authority of the municipal government and the municipal Party committee, did not include any of the five deputies from Jiaoqu who also served as cadres of the Party committee either at the municipal level or at the county level. In short, the institution of LPCs helps the regime to be informed of problems strictly within an electoral district and to solve those problems, but does not help the Party to be informed of or to solve the problems beyond each electoral district.

Conclusion

One of the distinctive characteristics of the activities of Yangzhou MPC delegates is that they represent the interests of their own electoral districts even when they are in conflict with the Party committee's interests. Moreover, it is unusual for congress delegates to jointly submit a bill with delegates from other electoral districts. This finding suggests that delegates are unified into factions but divided into fractions along electoral districts. As a result, even though the 1995 people's congress reforms allowed CCP candidates to lose in the county-level LPC elections, informal groupings among delegates have not led to electoral competition between informal proto-parties.

Is the institution of LPCs a tool of co-optation by the authoritarian regime? Brownlee [1] argues that "ruling parties have been the root cause of regime persistence in much of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia." How does an authoritarian party consolidate its one-party rule while advancing the marketization of the economy? One answer that institutionalization of LPCs in China suggests is strengthening the lawmaking and supervisory roles of legislative organizations ([3], 10). Lust-Okar [10] proposes that authoritarian rulers set a "structure of contestation" to constrain and split potential rebels in the Middle East. Gandhi [4, xvii] also concludes that nominally democratic institutions are "a way in which opposition demands can be contained and answered without appearing weak," and hence they are "instruments of co-optation."

The interactions between congress delegates and the municipal Party committee in Yangzhou seem to suggest that China's LPCs have become a forum where the authoritarian regime responds to opposition demands without appearing weak. Because delegates are unified into factions and divided into fractions along electoral districts, they are most effective in solving the problems that are caused by conflicts within a certain electoral district, while they are often ineffective in solving the problems beyond the district. This function of LPCs does not contradict the regime's survival strategy. Through the institutional process of local legislature, so far, the regime is informed of issues and the people's dissatisfaction, is responsive to popular preferences to a certain extent, and will be strengthened if it can solve problems in the people's favor.

Acknowledgments The authors thank Yuen Yuen Ang, Kevin O'Brien, and Vivian Zhan for their helpful comments. An earlier version of this analysis was presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Toronto, Canada, March 2012.

References

1. Brownlee, J. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an age of democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2. Chen, J., and B.J. Dickson. 2010. *Allies of the state: China's private entrepreneurs and democratic change*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. Cho, Y.N. 2009. *Local people's congresses in China: Development and transition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
4. Gandhi, J. 2008. *Political institutions under dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
5. Guthrie, D. 1999. *Dragon in a three-piece suit: The emergence of capitalism in China*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
6. Hurst, W. 2009. *The Chinese worker after socialism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
7. Kamo, Tomoki. 2006. *Gendai Chūgoku seiji to jūmin daihyō taikai: Jindai no kinō kaikaku to "ryōdō/hi ryōdō" kankei no henka [Contemporary Chinese politics and people's congresses: Reforms of people's congresses and changes in the "guiding-guided" (lingdao-bei lingdao) relationship]*. Tokyo: Keio University Press
8. Landry, P.F. 2008. *Decentralized authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's control of local elites in the post-Mao era*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
9. Levitsky, S., and L.A. Way. 2002. The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51–65.
10. Lust-Okar, E. 2005. *Structuring conflict in the Arab world: Incumbents, opponents, and institutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
11. MacFarquhar, R. 1998. Provincial people's congresses. *The China Quarterly* 155: 656–667.
12. Magaloni, B. 2006. *Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
13. Manion, M. 2008. When Communist Party candidates can lose, who wins? Assessing the role of local people's congresses in the selection of leaders in China. *The China Quarterly* 195: 607–630.
14. Manion, M. 2011. *Congresses with constituents, constituents without congresses: Representation for authoritarian rule in China. Unpublished manuscript*. Madison: University of Wisconsin.
15. Mozaffar, S. 2002. Patterns of electoral governance in Africa's emerging democracies. *International Political Science Review* 23(1): 85–101.
16. Nathan, A.J. 2003. Authoritarian resilience. *Journal of Democracy* 14(1): 6–17.
17. O'Brien, K.J. 1990. Is China's National People's Congress a "conservative" legislature? *Asian Survey* 30(8): 782–794.

18. O'Brien, K.J. 1990. *Reform without liberalization: China's national people's congress and the politics of institutional change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
19. O'Brien, K.J. 1994. Agents and remonstrators: role accumulation by Chinese people's congress deputies. *The China Quarterly* 138: 359–380.
20. O'Brien, K.J. 1994. Chinese people's congresses and legislative embeddedness: Understanding early organizational development. *Comparative Political Studies* 27(1): 80–109.
21. O'Brien, K.J. 2009. Local people's congresses and governing China. *The China Journal* 61: 131–141.
22. Shatz, E. 2006. Access by accident: legitimacy claims and democracy promotion in authoritarian Central Asia. *International Political Science Review* 27(3): 263–284.
23. Shedler, A. 2002. The menu of manipulation. *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 36–50.
24. Tanner, M.S. 1999. *The politics of lawmaking in China: Institutions, processes, and democratic prospects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. Wright, T. 2010. *Accepting authoritarianism: State-society relations in China's reform era*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
26. Xia, M. 2008. *The people's congresses and governance in China: Toward a network mode of governance*. New York: Routledge.

Tomoki Kamo is Associate Professor of Policy Management and Fellow of Global Security Research Institute at Keio University. His research and teaching focus on Chinese Politics, comparative legislatures of authoritarian regimes, and international relations of East Asia. His recent publication includes: *From the Revolution to the Open Door Policy* (in Japanese) (co-authored with Masafumi Iida and Ken Jimbo) (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2011); and *Contemporary Chinese Politics and People's Congresses: Reforms of People's Congresses and Changes in the "Guiding-Guided" (Lingdao-Bei Lingdao) Relationship* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2006).

Hiroki Takeuchi is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Fellow of the John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University. His research and teaching focus on Chinese and Japanese politics, comparative political economy of authoritarian regimes, and political economy and international relations of East Asia, as well as game theory applications to political science. His recent publication includes: "Political Economy of China's Trade Protection in the 1990s," *International Relations of Asia-Pacific* (2013, forthcoming); "Survival Strategies of Township Governments in Rural China: From Predatory Taxation to Land Trade," *Journal of Contemporary China* (2013, forthcoming); "Vote Buying, Village Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Rural China: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *Journal of East Asian Studies* (2013, forthcoming); "Economic Assistance, Central-Local Relations, and Ethnic Regions in China's Authoritarian Regime" (co-authored with Stan Wok-Hui Wong), *Japanese Journal of Political Science* (2013, forthcoming); and "Informal Lenders and Rural Finance in China: A Report from the Field" (co-authored with Li Zhou), *Modern China* 36(3), (2010).