Along with China’s rise, “China’s position in the world has changed” (p. xi) and the importance of understanding Chinese foreign policy has increased. The new book by Nathan and Scobell, which comprehensively discusses almost all aspects of Chinese foreign policymaking by taking China’s domestic politics into consideration, is one of the best guides to reflect the implications of China’s rise. It follows The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, written by Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross (published in 1997), and reflects the change of China’s position in world politics since then. As China is now one of the most powerful states in the world, Chinese foreign policy has become more complicated and analyzing it has become more challenging. However, Nathan and Scobell argue that two things are the same: first, we should look at Chinese policymakers’ point of view to analyze Chinese foreign policy; and second, China will not be a threat for the West unless the West weakens itself.

Nathan and Scobell analyze Chinese foreign policy by the framework of securing “four rings”: i.e., the First Ring is across the entire Chinese territory (including Taiwan, from the Chinese point of view); the Second Ring, China’s adjacent countries (including the countries that do not share land borders with China, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines); the Third Ring, six regional systems (overlapping the Second Ring: Northeast Asia, Oceania, continental Southeast Asia, maritime Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia); and the Fourth Ring, the world beyond the Third Ring (Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and North and South America). Interestingly, the United States is involved in all four rings from China’s perspective.
To analyze China’s security concern, Nathan and Scobell argue, realism is the most useful theoretical tool among international relations theories, as it “suggests foreign policy is driven by national self-interest—in turn meaning strategic and economic advantage, or what we call ‘security’” (p. xv). They do not think that liberalism is a useful tool, because “most foreign policy issues in China are managed by a small elite with little interference from other political institutions and social forces” (p. xvi). However, the change in China’s position in the world mainly comes from its involvement in the global market. Economic interdependence is a very important factor in explaining Chinese foreign policy for the last three decades, and liberalism argues that interdependence produces common interests, which would decrease conflict among states and weaken the role of military power and the insecurity it breeds. Thus in the rest of this review, I explore the book’s findings and arguments from the realist and liberal perspectives.

Realism could explain Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s and its split since the end of the 1950s could be explained by “China’s responding efforts to preserve its autonomy” (p. 66), and in the 1970s, “China’s new tie with the U.S. became an effective deterrent to Soviet attack on China” (p. 81). However, China’s relationship with the United States has turned into a new dimension beyond simply seeking security since the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping started the post-Mao economic reform and China gradually became an important actor in the global market. Now economic interdependence between China and the U.S. has reached the level where “to be free of dependence on the other for its own security…is a distant goal of either side, unless the other side withdraws from the race” (p. 113). China’s relationship with Japan is similar to its relationship with the United States in the sense that deepened economic interdependence has produced common interests, but it has been different because of the history issue. As a result, although “the two countries have
built trade and investment ties that rank among each country’s largest overseas economic relationships…the two countries remain politically far apart” (p. 122–3), and interdependence has neither decreased conflict nor weakened insecurity.

Another issue to which realism and liberalism bring complementary explanations is the Taiwan problem. China’s relationship with Taiwan is an interstate one, because a state is a geographically defined entity governed by a central authority that has the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within its boundaries, and Taiwan satisfies this definition. Thus, Taiwan is different from Tibet, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong although the book juxtaposes them in chapter 8. While the United States kept providing security for Taiwan after the normalization of diplomatic relations with China in 1979, economic interdependence brought China to an ironic outcome, as “the more economic and cultural contacts occurred across the Taiwan Strait from the late 1980s on, the more Taiwan residents, both native Taiwanese and those of mainland origin, valued Taiwan’s autonomy” (p. 215). Moreover, Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990s means “a retreat from the U.S. commitment to protect Taiwan from the mainland use of force…damage[s] American credibility as an ally in Asia so long as the PRC continues to deploy its forces for a possible attack on Taiwan” (239).

Is China a threat? Will China be a threat? Nathan and Scobell answer the first question negatively, arguing: “China would not easily replace the U.S. as a global superpower with enough reach and influence to preside over a stable world system” (p. 354), based on their finding that “China has not displaced Western influence” (p. 191) and its interests in the Fourth Ring remain segmental. For the second question, they also answer negatively and argue that “China must not be allowed to deny or restrict other states’ access to resources or to dictate the terms of global economic interaction” (p. 358). In sum, China will not be a threat unless the
United States withdraws from the position to solve problems in the world—in other words, the position to provide international public goods. China does not seem ready to take the position that the U.S. holds now, and hence if the U.S. withdraws from its current position, no one will provide international public goods, and that will be the real threat that China may pose to the world.